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eligious beliefs, especially those pertaining to the influence
of Gods, are among the most widely shared and deeply
personally important human beliefs1–4. They are also
among the most varied. Variability in religious belief and non-
belief is as universal as the presence of religion across human
cultures. Differences in belief have substantial impacts ranging
from personal identity formation5, to social/group affiliation and
exclusion6, to national and international political dynamics7,8.
Key questions thus concern the neurocognitive bases of individual
differences in belief. Theoretical accounts in the psychology and
anthropology of religion suggest that religious beliefs emerge, at
least in part, from perceptual mechanisms evolved for predictive
processing of environmental information1,2,9–16. Though it is not
possible to directly observe the co-evolution of religious beliefs
with human information processing, differences among humans
in religious and perceptual information processing phenotypes
provide another window into such relationships. That is, indivi-
dual differences in relevant perceptual mechanisms for predictive
processing of environmental stimuli may bias individuals towards
or away from religious beliefs.
A point of general consensus among explanatory frameworks
for human information processing is the simultaneous operation
of automatic bottom-up processes, driven primarily by sensory
and perceptual input, and top-down processes that are more
accessible to conscious awareness17–19. Critically, these two strata
of cognition are not fully discrete from each other in their
operation, and automatic bottom-up processes were likely the
evolutionary substrate from which more explicit forms of top-
down cognition arose20. Several theories of human cognition
delineate trajectories of influence by which bottom-up processes
direct individuals toward the formation of certain explicit
beliefs17,20–25. According to these accounts, intuitions (i.e.,
reportable experiences of knowledge that was not consciously
learned) develop as products of bottom-up gathering of envir-
onmental signals/information via unconscious information pro-
cessing20–25. Because individuals are not aware of such bottom-
up influences, intuitions drawn from unconscious processing may
instead be consciously interpreted via explicit belief narratives
that provide a rationalized context for beliefs and behaviors2,23,24.
Indeed, intuitions frequently bias more explicit top-down views
and judgments2,13,17,26, and certain explicit beliefs may be more
compelling and difficult to override when they stem from intui-
tive impressions2,13,17,27. These effects have been found to operate
across diverse modalities of sensory information processing28–30.
For example, in the context of interpersonal evaluations, humans
rely on rapid, nonconscious face processing to form intuitions of
trustworthiness29–31, which has substantial influence on sub-
sequent decision-making31.
With respect to religious belief, extant theoretical
accounts1,2,9,10,13–16,32 posit that evolved neurocognitive pro-
cesses contribute to default intuitions about the nature of envir-
onmental stimuli which direct individuals toward explicit beliefs.
For instance, neurobiology evolved for cooperative interactions
among humans is implicated as a basis for intuitions concerning
morality and fairness2,10,15. These intuitions, in turn, are theo-
rized to bias individuals toward religious beliefs in divine justice
and watchful Gods, which align with moral intuitions, and may
insulate against challenges to intuitions about justice when
commensurate retribution or compensation for a given act is not
materially available33. Other theoretical work has suggested a
connection of evolutionarily-favored pathogen-avoidance
mechanisms (e.g., evolved avoidance of individuals who are sick
to minimize transmission of pathogens) to intuitions concerning
cleanliness and religious beliefs concerning purity (e.g., belief in
the healing effects of touching holy individuals or items, belief in
unseen agents of spiritual corruption)16,34. Intuitions of
anthropomorphism, which appear to be biologically rooted in
systems evolved to support face processing and social-
cognition35, may contribute to beliefs in watchful invisible
agents36,37. Relatedly, the automatic bias to detect agency in the
environment is thought to yield over-attribution of intentional
agency at the intuitive level (i.e., intuitions that non-agentic
things have agency), which supports explicit beliefs about
supernatural, intelligent agents (e.g., deities)1,13,14. Empirical
support for this theory, however, has been mixed; recent work has
suggested that individuals may under attribute agency38, and that
believers in the paranormal—but not those who endorse a set of
more traditional religious beliefs—display illusory agency
detection39,40.
Other literature has suggested a link between top-down,
effortful analytic thinking—a propensity to critically examine and
override prepotent automatic41 responding—and religious
disbelief41,42. Gervais and Norenzayan43 reported that priming
analytic thinking reduced strength of religious belief. However,
replication attempts have not supported the efficacy of the so-
called analytic prime employed by Gervais and Norenzayan44,45.
A core belief across major religions is that the sequence and
structure of events in human lives (and in the universe more
broadly) reflects an underlying order determined by the inter-
vention of Gods3,4,46–50. Believers are more inclined to perceive
events in the world as adhering to a purpose or design rather than
as a series of random, unpredictable occurrences47,49. Indeed,
such interventionist belief is an explicit focus of religious practices
in Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism50. Empirical work
has associated belief in Gods with explanations of events as
adhering to an intelligently designed order49,51,52, and greater
belief that a deity plays a role in ordering life events is posited to
lead to increased strength of religious belief broadly50,53. This
suggests that identifying individual differences that influence
interventionist belief may provide explanatory insights into var-
iations in strength of religious belief in general. Moreover,
because belief in intervening/ordering Gods is a shared element of
disparate religions3,50, it provides a suitable testbed for hypoth-
eses concerning links between information processing and belief
that may transcend cultural context.
In view of the associations between intuition and religious
beliefs, it is notable that multiple lines of work in cognitive sci-
ence have specifically implicated order-related perceptual infor-
mation processing as a basis of intuitions21–23,54. In particular,
this work points to bottom-up learning of predictive order (pat-
terns) in the environment without conscious awareness (i.e.,
implicit pattern learning; IL-pat)20–23,25,54 as an underlying
influence. Reber21 identifies IL-pat as a bottom-up perceptual
basis of intuitions of order, including tacit-knowledge of complex
visuospatial patterns after extended exposure. This work is situ-
ated within a broader framework developed by Epstein and others
in which, “The implication of automatic implicit learning from
experience is that the information acquired… is the primary
source of intuitive ‘knowing without knowing how one knows’”23,
and in which such intuition serves as a bridge between implicit
and explicit levels of cognition23,24,54. Convergently, research into
individual differences in IL-pat55–58 has demonstrated that IL-pat
is positively associated with self-reported measures of intuition
across several paradigms.
The work identifying bottom-up information processing and
intuitions rooted in evolved neurocognitive systems as influences
on belief suggests the hypothesis that processing information
related to order in the environment via IL-pat could influence the
formation of belief in an intervening/ordering God. Specifically,
accounts implicating IL-pat as a basis of intuitions21–23,54, and
intuition as a basis of beliefs2,4,9,15,17,24, indicate a potential
pathway of effect whereby implicit learning of actual patterns/
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order in the environment could yield intuitions of ambient order
that, in turn, influence belief in an ordering God. In other words,
intuitions of order that result from IL-pat might dis-
proportionately direct stronger implicit learners toward explicit
beliefs in an intervening/ordering God.
Implicit pattern learning occurs frequently in real-world set-
tings and operates on a broad range of stimuli, including many
forms of visual modality input59; merely being in an environment
with recurring elements is sufficient to implicitly learn
associations60,61. Individual differences in implicit learning
emerge early in development60,62,63, with performance approx-
imating adult levels64. While extended longitudinal measurement
is challenging, extant evidence suggests that differences in IL-pat
are relatively stable across time65, including during early child-
hood66, and may be genetically determined67,68. Thus, any
impacts of IL-pat on intuitions of order are likely to begin in
young childhood via exposure to learnable patterns in the
environment. If IL-pat affects belief, it could thus manifest in
individual differences in change in strength of religious belief
from childhood to adulthood.
Because IL-pat is a fundamental, largely subcortically-mediated
aspect of perceptual information processing69,70, it is likely to be
present (and subject to individual differences) in all human
groups. Thus, if IL-pat helps shape belief, then individual dif-
ferences in IL-pat should be predictive of differences in belief
across disparate cultures and religions. As noted above, belief in
intervening/ordering Gods is a common element across disparate
religions3,4,46–48,50, thus this aspect of belief presents an oppor-
tunity to evaluate the influence of IL-pat across religions. More-
over, beyond the context of this study, a timely priority for
empirical understanding of religious cognition is the inclusion of
non-Western cultural contexts that are substantially under-
represented in this literature71. Middle Eastern Islamic samples,
in particular, are largely absent from psychological research
broadly. Turkish Muslims are a relative exception72–74, but less
westernized nations in the region are dramatically under-
represented, such that sociocultural influences on cognitive and
behavioral phenotypes (religious and otherwise) remain poorly
understood75,76. In addition to the inherent value of expanding
psychological research in the Middle East, investigating the
replicability of findings across U.S. and Middle Eastern samples
provides the opportunity for strong tests of mechanisms hypo-
thesized to operate across disparate sociocultural contexts.
Multiple experimental paradigms have been developed to
investigate IL-pat. Perhaps the most widely used measure is the
serial reaction time task (SRTT)77,78, which prior work suggests is
reflective of environmental IL-pat21, and which has recently been
shown to load heavily on a broad implicit learning ability factor65.
Notably, extant evidence indicates that IL-pat during the SRTT is
not improved—and may actually be impaired—by top-down
influences, including instructions to look for patterns61,69,79,80
(see “Methods”). In addition, modifications of the SRTT have
been devised to limit opportunities for explicit awareness of
patterns that could be a precondition for top-down influence69,81.
The SRTT thus presents a good experimental measure to inves-
tigate putative bottom-up link of IL-pat to belief: stronger IL-pat
might contribute to stronger belief, but a belief-related top-down
bias to seek patterns is unlikely to strengthen IL-pat, thus, any
positive association observed between IL-pat and belief is most
likely to be bottom-up.
Here, in culturally and religiously distinct samples studied in
Washington, D.C. and Kabul, Afghanistan, we test and support
the hypotheses that individual differences in implicit pattern
learning, measured via a modified SRTT77,78,82, predict individual
differences in (1) strength of belief in an intervening/ordering
God, and (2) change in strength of belief in God from childhood
to adulthood. We distinguish effects of IL-pat from potential
confounding influences of schizotypal ideation and parental
religious belief as well as potential effects of explicit learning.
Subsequent analyses in the U.S. sample further support the
hypothesis that intuitions of universal order mediate the rela-
tionship of IL-pat to belief. Data from a predominantly European
sample provide additional replication and extension. Results
indicate that superior bottom-up, implicit learning of visuospatial
patterns is associated with stronger belief in an intervening God
and increased strength of belief from childhood to adulthood.
Results
Implicit pattern learning (IL-pat). Because a goal of this
research was to test whether results replicated across religiously
and culturally disparate contexts, all analyses were performed
separately for each of the samples.
U.S. (N= 199, Mage= 19.83 ± 2.72 years, 65.83% female,
34.17% male, 52.26% Christian, 25.13% unaffiliated, all others
<4%, Supplementary Table 1) and Afghan (N= 148, Mage=
26.99 ± 4.57 years, 41.22% female, 58.78% male, religious
affiliation not queried due to potential risks associated with
non-Islamic affiliation) participants completed a modified
SRTT78,82, a widely used measure considered to be reflective of
ecological implicit learning ability21. Participants responded to
the positions of filled circles (targets) that rapidly appeared at four
positions onscreen by pressing a corresponding key (“Methods”;
Fig. 1). Each block of targets either adhered to a repeating 10-
position sequence (pattern), or was random (50% pattern blocks;
50% random blocks). Consistent with recommended proce-
dures77, implicit pattern learning was calculated as the difference
between slope-of-change in response time (RT) during random
vs. pattern blocks to enable measurement of faster responding
due to learning distinct from confounding influences (e.g.,
motivation, familiarity).
In order to verify that pattern blocks were distinguishable from
random blocks at the implicit level (i.e., based on RT differences),
we conducted paired t-tests for each sample between the rate of
change for pattern and random blocks. Both U.S. and Afghan
participants displayed a faster rate of change on pattern blocks,





















Fig. 1 SRTT. Participants indicated target locations corresponding to four
keys (a). For example, when the target appeared in the left most location,
participants responded by pressing the “z” key. Pattern blocks (b) consisted
of 10-target repeating (5×) sequences, containing three first-order
structures (orange bar) and two second-order structures (green circles).
Random blocks (c) consisted of 50 non-repeating targets.
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(U.S.: t(198)=−10.95, P < 0.0001; Afghanistan: t(147)=−7.61,
P < 0.0001). To further evaluate whether learning was implicit,
following each block, participants were asked to indicate whether
they thought the sequence they saw was a pattern or was random.
In both samples, IL-pat was uncorrelated with explicit accuracy
about whether patterns were present (U.S.: r=−0.12, P= 0.10;
Afghanistan: r= 0.08, P= 0.40), confirming that learning was
implicit. Relatedly, IL-pat was not associated with illusory explicit
pattern detection, i.e., incorrectly reporting the presence of a
pattern on random blocks (U.S.: r= 0.03, P= 0.67; Afghanistan:
r= 0.01, P= 0.93).
Relationship of IL-pat to belief. An interventionist belief (IB)
component score (see “Methods”; Supplementary Methods) was
calculated from three belief measures: the Belief in Divine
Intervention Scale3 (BDIS; Supplementary Table 3) and two
versions of the Overlapping Circles Task83 (Supplementary
Fig. 1), in which participants used object representations to
indicate beliefs about the extent to which God influences events in
the world and their own actions. Briefly, IB was created in order
to integrate estimates of belief in divine intervention obtained
from all three belief measures into a single DV for regression
models (see “Methods”).
Next, linear regression models in each sample tested our
hypothesis that IL-pat predicted IB. We controlled for schizotypal
ideation and parents’ strength of belief to distinguish effects of IL-
pat from key psychological and environmental factors that are
associated with religious belief84,85 and biases to perceive
order86,87 but distinct from the hypothesized influence of IL-pat
(see Supplementary Tables 10 and 11). Implicit pattern learning
significantly predicted IB in both the U.S. (b= 1.24, β= 0.17, SE
= 0.47, P= 0.009) and Afghanistan (b= 1.60, β= 0.26, SE=
0.48, P= 0.001; Fig. 2). Because of the non-normal distribution of
IB (Supplementary Fig. 2), we conducted additional analyses,
which confirmed that the observed associations with IL-pat were
not due to a violation of OLS assumptions (Supplementary
Table 9).
We further performed zero-order correlations (Supplementary
Tables 5 and 6) with scores on the individual intervening belief
measures to confirm that the relationship between IL-pat and IB
was not a result of associations with just one or two of the belief
measures from which IB was derived. Implicit pattern learning
was positively associated with BDIS at a trend level in the U.S.
(r= 0.13, P= 0.06) and significantly in Afghanistan (r= 0.19,
P= 0.02). In both samples, implicit pattern learning was also
significantly associated with self-overlap (U.S.: r= 0.19, P=
0.007; Afghanistan: r= 0.19, P= 0.02) and world overlap (U.S.:
r= 0.16, P= 0.03; Afghanistan: r= 0.26, P= 0.001). These
findings indicated a consistent underlying association between
implicit pattern learning and diverse individual measures of belief
in an interventionist God across these two culturally disparate
samples.
Belief change was surveyed using a lab-developed measure,
which consisted of 9-point Likert scales on which participants
reported their own strength of belief in God starting at age 6 and
then at 3-year intervals up to age 24 (see “Methods”,
Supplementary Methods). This method to assess change in
religious belief is consistent with prior work that has used a
retrospective approach to assess changes in religiosity over the
lifespan41,88.
IL-pat was a significant predictor of belief change in both the
U.S. (b= 3.53, β= 0.15, SE= 1.67, P= 0.036) and Afghanistan
(b= 3.53, β= 0.17, SE= 1.67, P= 0.036; Fig. 2), with schizotypal
ideation and parents’ strength of belief again included as covariate
regressors (Supplementary Tables 10 and 11).
In order to further confirm that implicit pattern learning—
rather than explicit awareness—was driving the association with
religious belief, we performed zero-order correlations for explicit
accuracy on the SRTT with IB and belief change. Explicit
accuracy was not related to IB (U.S.: r= 0.07, P= 0.30;
Afghanistan: r= 0.13, P= 0.14) or belief change (U.S.: r= 0.06,
P= 0.42; Afghanistan: r= 0.06, P= 0.51). We also tested the
association of IB and belief change with illusory explicit pattern
detection (i.e., reporting patterns for random blocks) and more
frequent endorsements of patterns regardless of block type. IB
was not correlated with illusory detection (U.S.: r= 0.08, P=
0.23; Afghanistan: r= 0.15; P= 0.09) or overall tendency to
reported patterns (U.S.: r= 0.04, P= 0.56; Afghanistan: r= 0.06,
P= 0.51). Similarly, we did not observe an association between
belief change and illusory detection (U.S.: r= 0.11, P= 0.11;
Afghanistan: r= 0.05, P= 0.55) or an overall bias towards
reporting patterns (U.S.: r= 0.09, P= 0.21; Afghanistan: r=
0.02, P= 0.86). When these explicit awareness variables were
included as additional covariate regressors (along with parents’
belief and schizotypal thinking; Supplementary Tables 12, 13), IL-
pat remained a significant predictor of both IB (all Ps ≤ 0.009)
and belief change (all Ps ≤ 0.05).
Finally, we conducted an initial probe of the relationship
between IL-pat and belief in the existence of God broadly
(Existence Belief; EB) using a single-item measure in the U.S.
sample only (no viable translation of this item could be found for
the Afghan sample; see Supplementary Methods). As expected,
EB was positively correlated with IB (r= 0.66, P < 0.0001).
However, exploratory analyses to assess whether EB was
associated with IL-pat revealed no correlation (r= 0.05, P=
0.50). Thus, while IB and EB were strongly correlated, only the
former was associated with IL-pat. Because EB was closely related
to IB in some participants (but not in others), we next asked
whether IL-pat was more associated with Existence Belief in
individuals for whom IB more closely approximated Existence
Belief and less associated with Existence Belief in those for whom
Existence Belief was more divergent from IB (putatively
explaining the discrepant relationships of IL-pat to IB vs. EB).
After calculating similarity between EB and IB for each
participant (see Supplementary Methods), we explored whether
IL-pat differentially predicted EB based on how closely EB and IB
were related (i.e., a belief similarity X IL-pat interaction). This
model revealed a significant interaction, such that the association
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Fig. 2 Linear regression models to predict interventionist belief (IB) and
belief change (BC) in the U.S. and Afghan samples. Significant β are
indicated by filled circles. Black fill indicates P < 0.05 (P= 0.036 for effect
of IL-Pat on belief change in both samples; P= 0.009 for IL-Pat on IB in U.S.
sample) and gray fill indicates P≤ 0.001. Error bars represent 95% CI.
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participants whose IB more closely approximated Existence Belief
(β=−0.20, P= 0.002). Taken together, these post hoc analyses
demonstrate that, consistent with our hypothesis concerning IL-
pat as a contributor to IB, IL-pat was more predictive of Existence
Belief in participants for whom the level of Existence Belief was
closely tied to the level of IB, and less predictive in those whose
belief in God appeared to be less tied to belief in the intervening
influence of God (i.e., those who report higher levels of Existence
Belief relative to IB).
Relationship of IL-pat and belief to intuitions of order. Having
identified relationships between IL-pat and explicit belief, we
sought to further test the hypothesis that intuitions about order in
the universe might mediate these relationships. Given prior work
indicating that IL-pat contributes to intuitions of order17,20–23
and that intuitions contribute to religious belief1,2,10–14,16,32, we
hypothesized a pathway of effect in which IL-pat contributes to
intuitions of order that incline individuals toward religious belief
narratives. The hypothesized directionality of this pathway was
also based on theoretical considerations, e.g., that intuitions of
order can plausibly develop from implicit learning of order even
without explicit learning of religious narratives, and that the
content of what is learned via IL-pat (i.e., order itself) is con-
ceptually closer to intuitions directly concerning order than to
religious beliefs about interventionist deities (see “Discussion”).
Participants were presented with statements concerning the
presence of order in the universe but not referring to religion or
God, and indicated their level of agreement (1–9; see “Methods”;
Supplementary Table 4). Responses were summed to produce a
universal order (UO) score. Agreement with presented statements
has been shown to provide an effective explicit measure of
intuition89. Because data collection for these questions in the
Afghan sample was not deemed viable (i.e., Afghan experimenters
indicated that the Dari-translated questions were not properly
understood; see “Methods”), we measured UO and IB in a
separate, predominantly European replication sample online (N
= 96, Mage= 28.21 ± 9.31 years, 83.33% European, 61.46%
female, 37.50% male; see “Methods”, Supplementary Table 2).
First, we asked whether UO and IL-pat were associated with
one another (i.e., Fig. 3, a path). Zero-order correlations indicated
that UO was positively correlated with IL-pat (r= 0.20, P=
0.005). Based on indications that schizotypal thinking may be
associated with a tendency to perceive order86,87, and to account
for potential influences of parental religious belief84,85, we
included schizotypal thinking and parents’ religious belief as
covariates in a linear regression model to predict UO. IL-pat
remained a significant predictor of UO in this model (b= 5.12, β
= 0.18, SE= 1.90, P= 0.008, Supplementary Table 10).
UO was also significantly correlated with both IB (U.S.: r=
0.48, P < 0.001; European sample: r= 0.56, P < 0.001) and belief
change (U.S. sample: r= 0.36, P < 0.001; Fig. 3, b path).
Consistent with our hypotheses, UO significantly mediated the
effects of IL-pat on both IB (indirect effect P= 0.005) and belief
change (indirect effect P= 0.006; bootstrapped bias-corrected
95% CI; Fig. 3) in the U.S. sample. These analyses do not establish
causation because mediation analysis is fundamentally correla-
tional. Nonetheless, results suggest that the a priori directional
hypothesis remains plausible a posteriori in view of the data. By
contrast, if modeling the pathway had not yielded significant
indirect effects, this would have empirically indicated against the
hypothesized model. Though the hypothesized pathway of effect
is based on theory and prior literature, rather than empirical
comparisons between competing models, further exploratory
analyses (Supplementary Methods, Supplementary Figs. 6 and 7)
in which IB and individual belief measures were modeled as
mediators, and in which IB was modeled as the independent
variable and IL-pat as the dependent variable, provided modest
but consistent additional support for the hypothesized model.
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). The above results supported
hypothesized links of intuition to IL-pat and belief—these
hypotheses specifically concerned intuitions of order (i.e., UO).
Subsequently, we explored a secondary question concerning the
CRT90, a measure of calculation-based problem-solving devised
to distinguish responding based on a more effortful and analytic
approach from responding based on a less effortful and analytic
(and more error-prone) approach; the latter approach has been
referred to as intuitive thinking. Investigation of the CRT was
motivated by prior research that has suggested a connection
between nonbelief and analytic problem-solving on the
CRT42,44,45,91–93. It was thus of interest to determine whether IL-
pat was related to CRT performance, and whether the associa-
tions of IL-pat to belief and to intuitions of order (as measured by
UO) were independent of the kind of analytic vs. intuitive
problem-solving measured by the CRT. All U.S. participants who
completed the full study battery were re-contacted, and respon-
dents (U.S. re-contact sample; N= 65) completed the CRT. The
CRT consists of three arithmetic problems. For each problem,
there is a response that is considered to be prepotent (i.e., the first
answer that comes to mind), which is referred to as the intuitive
response, whereas calculating the correct answer is posited to
require greater analytic, top-down effort. Correct (0–3) and
intuitive (0–3) responses are summed for each participant.
Incorrect responses that are not the intuitive response are ignored
in the calculation of correct and intuitive scores. Following Fre-
derick, the number of correct responses was interpreted as an
estimate of analytic problem-solving, or the extent to which
individuals are able to override prepotent (incorrect) responses.
Consistent with the associations observed in the full U.S.
sample, IL-pat was significantly correlated with IB (r= 0.46, P=
0.0001), belief change (r= 0.39, P= 0.002), and UO (r= 0.39, P
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Fig. 3 Explicitly reported intuitions of universal order (UO) mediate
effects of implicit pattern learning on belief. a IB and b belief change in
the U.S. Sample. The influence of implicit pattern learning on religious belief
without (dashed lines) and with (solid line) UO as a regressor is shown.
The model displays the unstandardized coefficients for each path, with P
values indicated parenthetically.
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obtained from the full sample, there was no association between
IL-pat and accuracy of explicit pattern judgments (r=−0.18, P
= 0.16), indicating that learning in this sub-sample was implicit.
Results for the CRT indicated that analytic (i.e., correct) and
intuitive (incorrect) responses were strongly negatively correlated
with each other (both samples r <−0.85, P < 0.0001), as in prior
research90. In the analyses of greatest interest, we found that IL-
pat was not associated with analytic responding (r=−0.07, P=
0.56) or intuitive responding (r=−0.03, P= 0.84; Supplementary
Table 14). Linear regression models in which CRT performance
was added as an additional covariate regressor (in addition to
schizotypal thinking and parents’ belief) indicated that IL-pat
remained a significant predictor of IB (b= 3.22, β= 0.43, SE=
0.81, P < 0.001), belief change (b= 9.88, β= 0.40, SE= 2.96, P=
0.001), and UO (b= 11.64, β= 0.38, SE= 3.61, P= 0.002;
Supplementary Table 16). Together these results indicate that
the relationship of IL-pat to IB, belief change, and UO was
meaningfully distinct from CRT-based problem-solving
approach. That is, it is unlikely that individual differences in
the tendency to effortfully apply analytic thinking to override
prepotent responding (at least in the context of CRT calculation
problems) are responsible for variation in IL-pat or the
association between IL-pat and belief. The CRT was also collected
online in the European replication sample. Generally consistent
with prior work associating analytic thinking more closely with
disbelief than belief41,42, associations were found between IB and
CRT performance (analytic: r=−0.22, P= 0.03; intuitive: r=
0.23, P= 0.02; Supplementary Table 15). These relationships were
not significant within the U.S. re-contact sample, though opposite
directions/signs were again observed for the nominal associations
of IB to analytic (r=−0.10, P= 0.41) and intuitive (r= 0.14, P
= 0.27) responding (Supplementary Table 14).
Assessment of belief in science. Last, we investigated whether
associations similar to those observed for belief in an interven-
tionist God (i.e., associations with intuitions of universal order
and implicit pattern learning) might also be observed for belief in
science, a construct that may plausibly relate to explanations of
order in the universe. All participants in the U.S. re-contact and
European samples completed the Belief in Science Scale94. This
scale consists of 10 questions intended to measure attitudes
toward science, such as its value, reliability, and ability to provide
an understanding of the world and human culture.
Consistent with prior research that has examined relationships
between religious belief and scientific belief94, zero-order
correlations indicated that scientific belief was inversely asso-
ciated with IB (U.S. re-contact sample: r −0.22, P= 0.08;
European sample: r=−0.36, P= 0.0003) and belief change
(U.S. re-contact sample only: r=−0.28, P= 0.02). Despite this
negative direct correlation, it remained possible that stronger
intuitions of universal order and/or stronger IL-pat might be
associated with stronger belief in science if, for example, a subset
of participants who held strong intuitions of order in the universe
were biased toward scientific interpretations of such order.
However, results indicated this was not the case; belief in science
was unrelated to UO (U.S. re-contact sample: r=−0.19, P= 0.13;
European sample: −0.11, P= 0.27; Supplementary Table 15) and
negatively correlated with IL-pat (U.S. re-contact sample: r=
−0.28, P= 0.02; Supplementary Table 14).
Discussion
The present study explored the relationship between implicit
pattern learning and belief in Gods in the U.S. and Afghanistan,
countries that differ substantially along multiple cultural and
religious dimensions7,95–97. In findings replicated across these
samples, individuals exhibiting stronger implicit learning of order
in visuospatial sequences held stronger belief in an intervening/
ordering God, and increased more in strength of belief from
childhood to adulthood. UO mediated these effects in the U.S.,
suggesting that IL-pat may be associated with interventionist
belief because it yields intuitions of order that bias individuals
toward belief in ordering Gods. Neither IL-pat nor belief was
associated with explicit awareness of learned patterns, indicating
that the observed effects are specific to learning of patterns
without conscious awareness.
The present work builds on substantial literatures indicating
implicit learning as a basis of intuition21–23,54, and intuition as a
basis of belief2,11,12,14,15,17,26. Our findings accord with theories in
the psychology and anthropology of religion1,2,9,10,12–16,32 that
account for religious belief as a reflective elaboration2 on intui-
tions derived from bottom-up processing of environmental sti-
muli. The present findings support a conceptually aligned
hypothesis that individuals who more readily learn, at an implicit
level, patterns that are actually present in the environment may be
biased toward belief in ordering Gods. Conversely, those who less
readily learn available patterns via IL-pat may be less predisposed
toward such beliefs.
The results of the current study are consistent with a bottom-
up pathway of effect by which stronger implicit learning of pat-
terns/order leads to belief in an intervening/ordering God. While
top-down pathways are also conceivable whereby stronger belief
in an intervening deity leads individuals to more effectively learn
implicit patterns, and/or whereby religious individuals may be
more likely to search for patterns because of an explicit belief in
the ordering influence of a deity, a number of empirically-based
indicators make such explanations less likely in this case. First,
prior research has demonstrated that explicit searching does not
lead to faster responding during the SRTT, and may actually
hinder performance61,69,79. For example, Fletcher and collea-
gues79 showed that explicitly directing participants to search for a
pattern impeded implicit learning on the SRTT (i.e., slower RT
during the task), putatively because this explicit search disrupts
elements of task performance that facilitate IL-pat. Thus, even if
interventionist belief promotes explicit searching for patterns, it is
unlikely that this would have led to improved performance on the
SRTT in the present study.
A bottom-up interpretation of the present data is further bol-
stered by modifications to the SRTT paradigm that were incor-
porated into the present study. Namely, the sequence advanced
(i.e., the next target appeared) immediately after the participant
provided a correct response. This so-called no-response-time-
interval (no-RSI) version of the SRTT has been demonstrated by
Destrebecqz and Cleeremans and others69,81 to yield sequence
learning without explicit knowledge acquisition. Removing time
between target presentations is intended to ensure that learners
are consistently engaged in the task and do not have the oppor-
tunity to consciously attempt to recall/rehearse the target
sequence in an effort to identify patterns while waiting for the
next target to appear. Consistent with prior work, we did not
observe a significant correlation between sequence learning (i.e.,
rate of change on pattern sequences relative to random ones) and
explicit awareness, indicating that learning was implicit. The lack
of association between CRT performance and implicit learning on
the SRTT may further suggest that differences in IL-pat were
unlikely to be driven by a bias towards effortful top-down
thinking.
The observed association between IL-pat and change in belief
from childhood to adulthood can be taken as further indication
against the likelihood of religious belief exerting a top-down
influence on IL-pat. Change in belief across the lifespan, and
particularly from childhood to adulthood, is not uncommon41,88.
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-18362-3
6 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2020) 11:4503 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-18362-3 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
Thus, to the extent that individual differences in implicit learning
are present at early ages60,62,63, and may be stable across time64–66,
it appears more likely that differences in IL-pat could drive
changes in belief across development than that changes in belief,
or adult level of belief in an interventionist God as measured in the
present study, are primary drivers of differences in IL-pat. Evi-
dence of genetic influences on IL-pat67,68, further suggests sources
of individual differences in IL-pat that may be present prior to,
and largely independent of, top-down influences.
While the bottom-up directionality of effect we have outlined is
consistent with prior work on the neurocognitive bases of reli-
gious belief1,2,9–12,16, it is not possible—and is not the intent of
the present study—to conclusively rule out any degree of top-
down influence on the relationship between IL-pat and religious
belief. Indeed, a complete rendering of the cognitive and envir-
onmental influences on a phenotype as complex as religious belief
very likely includes a multiplex of interconnected loop archi-
tectures between bottom-up and top-down processes. Examples
of top-down influences on automatic perceptual information
processing are abundant19,23,98. One pertinent example is
research showing that induced meaning threats devised to chal-
lenge participants’ existential sense of meaning were associated
with better implicit learning in an artificial grammar task99.
Religious belief is associated with a desire for meaning4,11,46, and
it is conceivable that more religious participants might tonically
feel greater threat to meaning, which may have an influence on at
least some forms of IL-pat. It should be noted that the
improvement in grammar learning in this prior work was linked
to an increased explicit motivation to find grammatical letter
strings in the grammar learning task, whereas extant evidence
indicates such explicit motivation does not improve learning on
the SRTT61,69,79. More directly to the point, even if it is the case
that some amount of top-down influence has bearing on implicit
learning, this would not necessarily be inconsistent with bottom-
up influences of implicit learning on religious belief. While the
present study focused on individual differences in a strongly
bottom-up IL-pat paradigm to explore the thus far untested
relationship of bottom-up IL-pat to belief, the intent of the pre-
sent research is not to suggest that all bottom-up influences on
belief, and perhaps not even the IL-pat studied here, operate
entirely independently of top-down processes.
Regarding the specific directional pathway represented by our
mediation models, this directionality is based on a hypothesized
pathway of effect within which there are a priori reasons to
position intuitions of universal order prior to interventionist
belief (i.e., as the mediator and dependent variable, respectively).
Specifically, the directionality of the pathway is based on the a
priori consideration that implicit learning of patterns/order in
environmental stimuli is less likely to directly yield specific beliefs
about deities, and more likely to yield a general sense/intuition
that there is ambient order. Broad intuitions about the presence
of order do not depend on externally learned narratives about the
identities and powers of deities, and thus appear more likely to
arise intrinsically (i.e., within the individual, directly from that
individual’s bottom-up implicit learning of patterns/order).
Relatedly, intuitions of order appear more conceptually prox-
imate to the content being learned via implicit learning of order
than to the content of beliefs about deistic intervention (i.e., both
the intuitions and the implicitly learned content directly concern
order itself, rather than explanations of order). Thus, a progres-
sion from IL-pat to UO appears more likely than a direct leap
from implicit learning to religious narratives about interventionist
deities. As noted above, the hypothesized pathway of effect is also
based on prominent extant accounts, developed to interpret
decades of research on implicit learning, which indicate that IL-
pat gives rise to intuitions of order17,20–25. Thus, in view of
theoretical considerations and extant literature, we hypothesized a
pathway of effect whereby implicit learning influences UO and
UO influences interventionist belief (i.e., implicit learning yields
broad intuitions of order that predispose individuals toward belief
narratives that fit these intuitions).
It is important to emphasize that the mediation analyses we
conducted to test models of the hypothesized pathway should not
be taken as establishing causation. Mediation is fundamentally a
correlation-based technique, and is frequently over-interpreted to
make causal claims100–102. Establishing causation requires a
comprehensive research program that should ideally include
longitudinal and intervention-based paradigms, a careful
accounting of the influence of a host of measured and unmea-
sured mediating variables, and replication across varied experi-
mental paradigms100. While this is beyond the scope of a single
study, the pathway of effect modeled in the present study pro-
vides a framework for more comprehensive investigations of
causation in the observed relationships, and the present data on
belief change from childhood to adulthood suggest that long-
itudinal study might be particularly informative.
The present research also explored the extent to which IL-pat is
related to individual differences in analytic problem-solving
(measured by the CRT). An influence of analytic thinking on IL-
pat might be posited whereby analytic thinking is associated with
increased top-down searching for patterns, which could hinder
IL-pat on the SRTT in nonreligious participants, given previous
associations of analytic problem-solving on the CRT with lower
levels of religious belief41,42. However, the lack of association
between CRT and IL-pat suggests no such influence in the present
study, perhaps owing in part to the attributes of the SRTT
paradigm devised to minimize top-down influence (described
above). Our findings further indicated that the associations of IL-
pat to IB, belief change, and UO were independent of CRT per-
formance. To our knowledge, this is the first research to
empirically test whether performance on the CRT is associated
with implicit pattern learning. Prior research that has suggested
an association of implicit learning to thinking style has assessed
intuitive thinking via self-report55–57. For example, Woolhouse
and Bayne measured intuition using the self-report sensing-
intuition scale of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. These pre-
vious approaches are more similar to the self-report measure of
universal order intuitions in the present study than to the CRT. In
contrast, assessment of thinking style in the context of arithmetic
calculation on the CRT is most likely to be related to differences
in so-called system 1 (automatic) and system 2 (deliberate)
problem-solving17, which appears conceptually distinct from the
presence of broad intuitions of order that we and others20–23,54
have suggested may arise from IL-pat, and that the present work
investigated as a potential mediator of the effect of IL-pat on
belief. Arithmetic calculation is also likely to reflect common
math/calculation-specific influences on elements of thinking style
related to motivation, avoidance and cognitive function103–105.
While UO and IL-pat were consistently associated with IB across
the various samples we studied, UO and IL-pat were not found to
be associated with scores on the Belief in Science Scale94. Thus, it is
likely that intuitions of ambient order more closely relate to IB than
to belief in science, at least within the (certainly non-exhaustive)
scope of what is measured by the presently employed survey of UO
and Belief in Science Scale. More generally, the present findings do
not rule out the possibility that nonreligious order-related beliefs,
scientific or otherwise, could be related to UO or IL-pat. For
example, because at least one item on the Belief in Science Scale
directly contrasts belief in science with religious belief, it is possible
that the present study underestimated the extent to which religion
and science might operate concurrently as ordering beliefs in some
individuals. However, even if the relationships of IL-pat and UO to
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IB were found to operate in parallel to other relationships involving
other ordering beliefs, this would not necessarily diminish the
relationships to IB.
We did not observe an association between IL-pat and a single-
item measure of belief in God’s existence broadly (i.e., Existence
Belief). This finding provides initial indication that the putative
influence of IL-pat may be specific to interventionist belief (i.e.,
the hypothesized effect of learning orders implicitly on belief in
an ordering God). Exploratory data analysis indicated that IL-pat
was more strongly related to Existence Belief in a subset of
individuals for whom belief that God exists is largely focused and/
or dependent on belief in the interventionist influence of God,
and less related to Existence Belief in others for whom belief in
the existence of God depends more on other factors.
We also did not observe an association between explicit
judgments about sequence blocks of the SRTT and religious
belief. We are not aware of any research that has described an
association between accurate, conscious detection of patterns and
religious belief, though some prior research has reported an
increased tendency among believers in the paranormal to report
some forms of illusory contingency106,107. Erroneous reporting of
patterns on the random blocks, as well as overall tendency to
report patterns across both block types (random and pattern),
was not correlated with IB or belief change in the present study.
When these variables were included as additional covariate
regressors in the above-reported models, the effects of IL-pat on
both IB and belief change were not altered. Because IL-pat was
also uncorrelated with explicit accuracy in reporting patterns, the
results consistently supported the interpretation that implicit
(rather than explicit) learning was driving the observed effects.
It is not evident, however, that the present results bear sub-
stantively on prior findings of explicit contingency reporting.
Prior research investigating reporting of illusory contingency
among believers in the supernatural was based on tasks and
theoretical models that are quite distinct from those in the pre-
sent study. In particular, prior studies investigated contingency in
the form of causal influence of a participant’s actions on observed
outcomes (i.e., the agency of the participant in a causal context).
This kind of contingency differs from the implicit pattern
learning we studied because (1) our paradigm was not related to
the participant’s agency (participants learned pattern sequences
that proceeded without any apparent opportunity for the parti-
cipant to influence them, and no instruction was given regarding
agency), and (2) the implicit learning sequences in the present
study were not devised to indicate any form of causality, nor were
participants given any instruction to consider causality as in prior
studies. In addition, many aspects of the experimental designs,
instructions, and stimulus modalities in these studies are quite
different from those employed in the present study. For example,
the contingency task employed by Blanco et al. involved a series
of judgments about whether or not to act by administering
medicine to patients, and illusions of causality were assessed
based on the extent to which a participant incorrectly believed
their administration of a non-contingent medicine was an effec-
tive treatment. Thus, illusory contingency was based on the
participants’ behavior and decision-making (and their perception
of their own agency), rather than how they perceive/respond to
implicitly learned stimuli. In addition, the authors related per-
formance on their contingency task to superstitious and para-
normal beliefs, which is a distinct outcome from the IB measures
used in the present study.
As cognitive and neural inquiries into religious phenotypes
advance, it is unlikely that any single large-scale explanatory factor
will fully capture the complexity and diversity of influences that
shape belief1,2,4,10,12,13,15,16. However, more modest effects that
replicate across diverse groups of believers have the potential to
provide meaningful componential insights into fundamental neu-
rocognitive bases of belief. Evidence linking religious belief to IL-pat
suggests that belief, and variation in belief, may be embedded in
fundamental bottom-up perceptual processing more deeply than
has previously been empirically explored. The observed association
of IL-pat with change in belief from childhood to adulthood (dis-
tinct from the powerful influence of parental belief) suggests that
the emergence of individual differences in IL-pat in early child-
hood69 might set individuals on bottom-up trajectories whereby
literally perceiving the world differently (i.e., differential processing
of patterned visual information available in the environment) helps
to move them either towards or away from religious belief.
The primarily subcortical information processing pathways that
instantiate IL-pat69,70 presumably operate in all healthy human
brains. Thus, if variations in belief are partially shaped by the
presence and individual variability of IL-pat, this effect may be
shared across diverse religious and cultural contexts. The present
research is consistent with this hypothesis, identifying shared
associations between IL-pat and belief in Western and Middle
Eastern contexts characterized by marked differences in religious
heterogeneity95, societal tolerance of religious diversity7, separation
of religion and government97, and religious restrictions96. Opti-
mistically, evidence of a shared link to a core component of human
perceptual information processing might help to emphasize an
underlying human commonality between believers and non-
believers, and between disparate religious groups.
Methods
Participants and design. The U.S. sample comprised 199 participants recruited
from Georgetown University and the local community. A subset of the U.S. sample
(U.S. re-contact; N= 65) completed additional measures (described below) to
assess analytic problem-solving as well as belief in science. Afghan participants (N
= 148) were recruited from primarily ethnic Hazara sections of Kabul (e.g., Karte
Seh, Dast-e Barchi) following study practices for culturally sensitive topics in
Afghanistan developed by Z.W., who has extensive data-gathering experience in
Afghanistan, including as director of the Asia Foundation’s Survey of the Afghan
People108, and tested in a private secure space by same-sex Afghan experimenters
(trained by Z.W.). Experimenters also completed online ethics training required by
the Georgetown University IRB. All forms, including the consent form, were
translated to Dari (one of two national languages, native for Hazaras) and then
back-translated to English. Extensive quality control efforts for Afghan data col-
lection are described in Supplementary Methods. Finally, we recruited an addi-
tional predominantly European online sample (N= 96; 83.33% European,
Supplementary Table 2) to complete measures related to interventionist belief,
universal order intuitions, analytic problem-solving, and belief in science.
All procedures were approved by the Georgetown University IRB. Samples were
sized sufficiently to detect small-to-moderate effects at α= 0.05 as there were not
prior studies of IL-pat-belief associations to indicate anticipated effect sizes, and
because religious belief is a complexly influenced phenotype such that any
individual influence is unlikely to account for a large proportion of the variance.
Measures. U.S. and Afghanistan participants completed a battery of tasks in a
single session lasting ~1.5 h. The SRTT was presented in E-Prime (Version 2.0). All
other task elements were administered using Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com/).
Descriptions of measures not used in the present study can be found in Supple-
mentary Methods.
Participants completed a modified SRTT, a widely used measure considered to
reflect ecologically valid IL-pat21. Participants were instructed to quickly and
accurately indicate the position of the target circle as it appeared at each of four
positions arranged horizontally onscreen (i.e., left, center-left, center-right, right;
Fig. 1). Each target position was designated a corresponding key on the keyboard,
and participants were instructed on which key was associated with each target
positions prior to beginning the task (moving from left to right, the mappings were
“z”, “x”, “.”, “/”). The version of the SRTT employed in the present study consisted
of six blocks (3 pattern blocks; 3 random blocks). Each pattern block was composed
of a distinct 10-target repeating sequence (repeated five times), consisting of three
first-order structures (Fig. 1b, orange bars) and two second-order triplets (Fig. 1b,
green circles). Random blocks did not include regular repetitions. For each block,
we calculated the correlation between target number (1–50) and response time.
Mean rates of change (average r values) were calculated for each participant for
pattern and random blocks. Consistent with recommended procedures77, IL-pat
was operationalized as the difference between random vs. pattern blocks to
distinguish faster responding that is due to learning from faster responding due to
confounding influences (e.g., motivation, familiarity). To assess explicit awareness,
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following each block, participants were asked to give their best guess as to whether
the block was or was not a pattern. Participants could respond from 1 (Definitely
Not a Pattern) to 4 (Definitely a Pattern). We calculated an overall accuracy score,
with a high score of 1 (responses of Definitely Not a Pattern for all random blocks
and definitely a pattern for all pattern blocks) and low of 4 (responses of Definitely
a Pattern for all random blocks and Definitely Not a Pattern for all pattern blocks).
Illusory detection was calculated as the average score on random blocks only,
ranging from 4 (low score: Definitely a Pattern for all) to 1 (high score: Definitely
Not a Pattern for all). An overall bias towards reporting patterns regardless of block
type was measured by subtracting accuracy for pattern blocks alone (high score=
1, low score= 4) from illusory detection, such that higher scores (max score= 3)
reflected more frequent reporting of patterns.
The extent to which individuals gain conscious access to implicitly learned
information has been a subject of considerable investigation21,69,77,81. A number of
steps were taken during the development of the task used in the present study to
isolate IL-pat and minimize the potential for explicit awareness. First, the blocks
were short in duration, as research has consistently demonstrated that participants
can gain some level of awareness with extended exposure to pattern SRTT
sequences69. In addition, the opportunity to explicitly recall/rehearse target
sequences in an effort to explicitly identify patterns for patterns was mitigated by
removing the response-stimulus interval (RSI) between key-press and the
appearance of the next target81. During no-RSI versions of the SRTT, the next
target appears immediately after the correct response is made; participants cannot
use time between target appearances (because the next target appears immediately)
to consciously attempt to identify a pattern structure.
Although participants were not explicitly told to search for any patterns, nor
were they told that any of the blocks would contain patterns, it is reasonable to
assume that questions about the presence of patterns may have caused some
participants to look for embedded patterns (note that this is quite distinct from
providing participants with any advance knowledge of the particular pattern
sequences to be presented). Of course, it is also possible that participants would try
to identify patterns in the sequences even without any questions related to patterns,
and there are likely to be individual differences in the tendency to seek patterns. Of
relevance to the present study, one possibility is that more religious people might
be more likely to search for patterns, e.g., because this might align with an explicit,
top-down belief that a God orders the universe. However, prior work has
demonstrated that this explicit searching does not improve implicit learning, and
may actually be deleterious61,69,79. It is therefore unlikely that a top-down tendency
to explicitly seek patterns would manifest in superior IL-pat in the employed
paradigm. In addition, within the present study, a measure of analytic problem-
solving (i.e., one’s tendency to engage a top-down, effortful approach to solving
problems; CRT; see below) was unrelated to implicit learning on the SRTT.
Next, participants completed a number of measures to assess beliefs about
Gods. The Belief in Divine Intervention Scale (BDIS3; Supplementary Table 3)
surveys participants’ level of agreement (six-point scale) with statements
concerning God intervening in the world and human affairs. Cronbach’s alpha was
similarly high in both samples (U.S.= 0.88; Afghanistan= 0.77), indicating that
the translated version of the measure was suitable for use in the Afghan sample.
Two overlapping circles (Supplementary Fig. 1) tasks—modified from prior
work83—were administered to measure beliefs about God’s influence on (1) their
own actions (i.e., self-overlap), and (2) events in the world (world overlap).
Participants arranged two circles onscreen such that the extent of overlap indicated
their own representation of the extent of God’s influence. More overlap was
interpreted as stronger belief in an intervening God.
Belief change was surveyed using a lab-developed change of belief measure,
which consisted of 9-point Likert scales on which participants reported their own
strength of belief in God starting at age 6 and then at 3-year intervals up to age 24.
Instructions stated that participants should not respond to items beyond their
present age. Asking participants to report belief at 3-year intervals was intended to
encourage more precise and thorough consideration of responses than might have
been achieved by a single query (e.g., how much has your belief changed since
childhood?). This method to assess change in religious belief is consistent with
prior work that has demonstrated the efficacy of assessing religiosity
retrospectively41,88. The primary outcome variable for belief change was the
difference between reported strength of belief at the youngest surveyed age (6
years) vs. belief at the time of the study. Further characterization of this variable
and its calculation can be found in the Supplementary Methods. U.S. participants
also completed a single-item Existence Belief measure for which they rated the
strength of their belief in the existence of God broadly using a 9-point Likert scale
(1= do not believe that God is real at all, 9= absolutely certain God is real).
Participants also completed measures to assess intuitions of order in the
universe. We initially created a 4-item survey (Supplementary Table 4) in which
participants were presented with statements concerning the presence of order in
the universe (without reference to religion or God) and asked to indicate their level
of agreement (1–9), consistent with demonstrated means of explicitly measuring
intuition89. Two of the original four UO questions were ultimately retained for
analysis. These were Q1—everything happens for a reason, and Q2—there is order
to the universe, for which responses were summed to produce a universal order
(UO) score. The two other UO questions, which were not retained, included
elements that could be interpreted as implied references to God: Q3—there is a
plan that guides events in the universe, and Q4—something beyond physics plays a
part in deciding what happens. Indeed, participant responses to these two items
were more strongly correlated with IB (both r ≥ 0.62) than were the two questions
retained for analysis (both r ≤ 0.42). The determination to exclude responses to Q3
and Q4 from analysis was made in order to more clearly distinguish UO from belief
in an intervening God (although post hoc analyses showed that inclusion of all
items did not meaningfully change the reported results; Supplementary Fig. 5).
Note that, because Q1 and Q2 were presented before Q3 and Q4, any implied
reference to a deity in Q3 or Q4 would not have influenced participants’
interpretation of Q1 or Q2. The UO survey for the European replication sample
consisted of only the first two items.
We anticipated that UO was unlikely to be meaningful for the Afghan sample
because of a lack of culture- and language-specific interpretability of the UO
prompts—much of the difficulty arose in the attempt to make the prompts secular
(i.e., to use wording/framing that referred to an order in the universe without
referring to a deity or any religious belief). These attempts ultimately led to
prompts that were not interpretable in the intended ways, as determined by Z.W. in
consultation with Dari-speaking experimenters. Therefore, scores on this measure
were not analyzed in this sample.
Finally, participants completed a number of other measures to estimate potential
confounding variables. U.S. participants completed the 37-question yes–no
Schizotypal Questionnaire, with the primary focus on the 17-item unusual perceptual
experiences subscale109, to distinguish effects of IL-pat from belief in supernatural
agency84,86,87. After translation and cultural adaptation, Afghan participants answered
a 36-item version, with a 16-item perceptual experiences subscale. Cronbach’s alpha
for the subscale was high (U.S.= 0.78; Afghanistan= 0.83), reflecting appropriateness
in both samples. To assess parents’ strength of religious belief, participants used a 9-
point Likert scale to rate the strength of their parents’ religious belief during the
participants’ childhood. Additional measures included the CRT90, which consists of
three calculation-based questions devised to elicit prepotent—but incorrect—
responses, referred to as intuitive. Overriding these prepotent responses in favor of
more effortful calculation, which is more likely to yield the correct solutions, is
considered analytic thinking (also referred to as reflection). The number of correct
and intuitive responses are summed for each participant. The CRT was completed by
the U.S. re-contact and online European samples. U.S. re-contact and European
samples completed the Belief in Science Scale94, which consists of 10 questions
intended to measure attitudes toward science, such as its value, reliability, and ability
to provide an understanding of the world and human culture.
Statistical analyses. In order to reduce the number of variables in subsequent
analysis, we sought to integrate three estimates of the same measurable char-
acteristic (belief in an intervening God) into a single DV for regression models. To
determine whether this was appropriate, we first ran zero-order correlations with
all three measures (BDIS, self-overlap, world overlap; Supplementary Tables 5–7).
For all samples, all scores were strongly positively correlated (all r > 0.54). Next, we
performed a principal component analysis (PCA; Supplementary Table 8) to
examine the structure of the data. We elected to perform a PCA because we
theorized that variance on the three interventionist belief measures would be
primarily due to a single, large component, consistent with the assumption
imposed by PCA that all factors be orthogonal. As expected, a single component
was retained for all samples. The ratio of the first to second eigenvalue was >2.5
(U.S.: component 1 eigenvalue= 2.30, component 2 eigenvalue= 0.48; Afghani-
stan: component 1 eigenvalue= 2.42, component 2 eigenvalue= 0.50; European
sample: component 1 eigenvalue= 2.30, component 2 eigenvalue= 0.41), sug-
gesting that scores on the three measures were indeed related to a single compo-
nent. The one component solution was further confirmed by parallel analysis (U.S.:
component 1 simulated eigenvalue= 1.11, component 2 simulated eigenvalue=
1.01; Afghanistan: component 1 simulated eigenvalue= 1.17, component 2 simu-
lated eigenvalue= 0.99; European sample: component 1 simulated eigenvalue=
1.16, component 2 simulated eigenvalue= 1.00) and Velicer’s MAP (U.S.: VSS 1
maximum complexity of 0.93 with one factor; Afghanistan: VSS 1 maximum
complexity of 0.94 with one factor; European sample: VSS 1 maximum complexity
of 0.93 with one factor). We therefore created an Interventionist Belief (IB) prin-
cipal component score for each participant using a least squares regression
approach such that scores for each sample had a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1 (Supplementary Fig. 2). All statistical analyses were performed in
STATA 15 and R (Version 1.1.4).
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
The study data are available on the OSF repository (https://osf.io/g5ywe/). A reporting
summary for this Article is available as a Supplementary Information file.
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